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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1779 
____________          
                                       
ROVAKAT, LLC, A Partnership, Shant S. Hovnanian, Tax Matters Partner, 
                Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
___________                       
 
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court 
(Docket No. 3251-09) 
United States Tax Court Judge: Honorable David Laro 
___________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 25, 2012 
 
Before:    HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion Filed:  June 17, 2013) 
___________                      
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Rovakat, LLC, a partnership for tax purposes, by its tax matters partner, Shant S. 
Hovnanian, appeals the December 21, 2011 decision of the United States Tax Court that 
substantially upheld notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustments (“FPAAs”) 
issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the “Commissioner”) for tax years 
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2002, 2003, and 2004.  The FPAAs, in pertinent part, disallowed more than $5 million in 
losses that Rovakat claimed from a “distressed asset/debt” (“DAD”) tax shelter, and 
imposed accuracy-related penalties under §6662(h) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 
U.S.C. § 6662(h).  Having carefully considered the Tax Court opinion, the record, and the 
parties’ contentions, we will affirm.   
I. 
 The parties are completely familiar with the complex transactions that provide the 
context for this dispute, and we will not recount here the facts that are so 
comprehensively presented in the Tax Court opinion.  Instead, for purposes of our 
decision, the following summary of the parties’ transactions suffices: 
 1.  On June 7, 2001, Credicom Asia redeemed its 
worthless class A common stock from its parent corporation, 
Credicom NV (“CNV”), for 1,718,116 Swiss francs and 
$303,375.  CNV’s claimed “basis” in the class A common 
stock, i.e., the amount it had invested in Credicom Asia’s 
class A common stock, approximated $184,000,000. 
 
 2.  The next day, CNV transferred the 1,718,116 Swiss 
francs and $303,375 to International Capital Partners, LP 
(“ICP”), in exchange for a partnership interest in ICP.1
 
 
 3.  On November 6, 2002, ICP transferred 50,000 of 
the Swiss francs, having a fair market value of $34,185, to 
Rovakat in exchange for a partnership interest in Rovakat.  
 
                                              
 1 ICP was a Cayman Islands limited partnership and founding partner of Rovakat.  
ICP was controlled by Lance O. Valdez, a tax attorney and financial advisor who put 
together DAD tax shelters.  Valdez was also president of Credicom Asia, and directed the 
transactions that formed the basis for the DAD tax shelter at issue in this case.   
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 4.  On December 26, 2002, ICP transferred 90% of its 
partnership interest in Rovakat to Mr. Hovnanian for 
$30,776.2
 
 
 5.  On December 27, 2002, Rovakat sold the 50,000 
Swiss francs to a third party for their fair market value of 
$35,468.3
 
 
 6.  Rovakat incurred almost $400,000 in costs related 
to these transactions, including fees of more than $380,000 to 
Valdez, and $13,000 for a tax opinion from a law firm 
recommended by Valdez. 
 
7.  On its tax returns for 2002, 2003, and 2004, 
Rovakat claimed that its basis in the 50,000 Swiss francs was 
$5,805,000, so that its transfer of the Swiss francs for $35,468 
generated a loss of more than $5,700,000.4
 
 
 In FPAAs issued for Rovakat’s 2002, 2003, and 2004 tax returns, the 
Commissioner determined that Rovakat had not established the claimed basis of 
$5,805,000 in the 50,000 Swiss francs, and thus was not entitled to deductions from 
                                              
 2 Mr. Hovnanian has a degree in economics from the University of Pennsylvania, 
and is a sophisticated investor as well as an entrepreneur in the information technology 
and medical devices fields. 
 
3 The Tax Court opinion was inconsistent with regard to the fair market value of 
the Swiss francs.  The Tax Court first stated that the francs were valued at $35,268, (App. 
21), but later stated that they were valued at $35,468 (App. 30.)  We use the latter 
number—$35,468—which is the value the parties stipulated to before the Tax Court.  
(Supplemental App. 52.) 
  
 4 As a general rule, property received in exchange for a partnership interest 
assumes the basis of the partner’s interest in the property.  See 26 U.S.C. § 721(a).  In this 
case, Rovakat treated Credicom Asia as a partnership and CNV as one of its partners, 
notwithstanding their corporate structures.   Asserting that CNV liquidated its partnership 
interest in Credicom Asia for “property” in the form of Swiss francs, Rovakat claimed 
that CNV’s basis in the class A common stock, totaling approximately $184,000,000, 
attached to the Swiss francs.  Rovakat claims a pro rata share of the purported basis in the 
Swiss francs. 
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ordinary income for the purported “loss” incurred when the Swiss francs were sold for 
$35,468.  The Commissioner found in the alternative that the deductions should be 
disallowed because the Swiss francs transaction lacked economic substance.  The 
Commissioner’s FPAAs also imposed a 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6662(h)(1) with respect to tax underpayments resulting from the 
wrongfully claimed losses attributed to the Swiss francs transaction. 
 Rovakat challenged the disallowances for the deductions attributed to the Swiss 
francs transaction in the Tax Court.  In rejecting Rovakat’s challenges, the Tax Court 
applied the “substance-over-form” doctrine, and found that Credicom Asia’s redemption 
of its class A stock from CNV, a corporation, could not be regarded as a transfer of a 
partnership interest.  Consequently, CNV’s basis in the class A stock did not attach to the 
Swiss francs received by CNV in exchange for the class A stock.  Alternatively, the Tax 
Court held that Rovakat could not claim a basis of more than $5,800,000 in Swiss francs 
having a market value of only approximately $35,000 because the transactions at issue 
lacked “sufficient economic substance to be respected for federal tax purposes.”  (App. 
47.)  Specifically, the Tax Court found that “[t]he francs transaction as a whole, when 
viewed in the light of its individual steps, had no economic significance other than to 
serve as a means for Mr. Hovnanian’s attempt to purchase and use CNV’s built-in-loss.”  
(Id. at 48.)  Observing that “[b]ecause a transaction that lacks economic substance is not 
recognized for Federal tax purposes, and ‘cannot be the basis for a deductible loss,’” the 
Tax Court ruled that Rovakat could not claim losses from that transaction.  (Id. at 64.)  
Finally, the Tax Court sustained the 40% accuracy-related penalties, rejecting Rovakat’s 
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assertion that it had acted in good faith and with reasonable cause on the basis of opinions 
from tax attorneys. 
II. 
Rovakat timely appealed the Tax Court decision, challenging the disallowances 
for the losses it attributed to the Swiss francs transaction as well as the 40% accuracy-
related penalties.5
A. The Disallowance of the Claimed Loss 
  The Tax Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 6226(f) and 7442.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482.   
 “[W]hile we conduct plenary review of the Tax Court's legal conclusions, we 
review its factual findings, including its ultimate finding as to the economic substance of 
a transaction, for clear error.”  ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1998).  
In this case, the Tax Court characterized the initial transaction in the series of transactions 
that culminated with Rovakat’s sale of Swiss francs, i.e., the redemption of Credicom 
Asia stock from CNV for Swiss francs and $303,375, to be a sale of common stock as 
opposed to a transfer of partnership interests as asserted by Rovakat.  It is firmly 
established that the substance of a transaction, and not its form, governs its tax treatment.  
See Comm’r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (“The incidence of taxation 
depends upon the substance of a transaction.”).  The Tax Court had ample justification 
for characterizing the redemption of Credicom Asia’s stock from its parent, CNV, as a 
                                              
 5 The Tax Court also sustained other adjustments made by the Commissioner in the 
FPAAs as well as the Commissioner’s 20% accuracy related penalty attributable to the 
underpayment of taxes resulting from the other adjustments to income and deductions 
made by the Commissioner in the FPAAs.  Rovakat does not challenge on appeal these 
aspects of the Tax Court’s decision. 
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sale.  In this regard, it is irrefutable that both CNV and Credicom Asia were corporations.  
Because CNV could not have transferred a partnership interest in exchange for dollars 
and Swiss francs, it could not carry over its basis in Credicom Asia class A stock to the 
Swiss francs that ultimately were transferred to Rovakat and sold for $35,468.  For this 
and all the other reasons articulated by the Tax Court in its exceedingly thorough opinion, 
the Tax Court did not err in rejecting the more than $5 million loss claimed by Rovakat.6
B. 
 
 We review the Tax Court’s findings with respect to the assessment of accuracy-
related penalties for clear error.  See Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 
1366, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  In this case, there is no dispute that Rovakat asserted a basis 
in the Swiss francs that exceeded 400% of the correct amount, triggering a 40% penalty 
for a “gross valuation misstatement[].”  See 26 U.S.C. § 6662(h).  Rovakat could avoid 
                                              
6 Although we need not reach the alternative ground articulated by the Tax Court 
for sustaining the disallowance of the claimed loss—the Swiss francs transaction lacked 
economic substance—we note that we discern no error in the Tax Court’s application of 
the economic substance doctrine as explicated in ACM Partnership.  Under this doctrine, 
“a transaction that is ‘devoid of economic substance’ must be disregarded for tax 
purposes and ‘cannot be the basis for a deductible loss.’”  ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 247 
(quoting Lerman v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 1991)).  The Tax Court faithfully 
adhered to the requirements that both the “‘objective economic substance of the 
transactions’ and the ‘subjective business motivation’ behind them” be examined.  Id. 
(quoting Casebeer v. Comm’r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990)).  Its findings on both 
prongs of the inquiry are well supported.  For example, on the objective component, the 
Tax Court properly considered that the nearly $400,000 in fees paid by Rovakat to obtain 
Swiss francs having a value of approximately $35,000 did not make economic sense 
independent of claiming a loss premised upon an artificially inflated basis in the Swiss 
francs.  As to the subjective component, the Tax Court likewise had substantial reasons 
for finding that “the economic reality of the francs transaction is not consistent with a 
bona fide profit objective.”  (App. 64.)  The Tax Court’s correct application of the 
“economic substance” doctrine provides an alternative basis for sustaining the 
disallowance of the claimed loss. 
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the penalty only by demonstrating both reasonable cause for its gross misstatement and 
good faith.  26 U.S.C. § 6664(c)(1).  Rovakat asserts that it satisfied its “heavy burden” 
of showing reasonable cause, Richardson v. Comm’r, 125 F.3d 551, 557 (7th Cir. 1997), 
because it had relied upon opinions issued by law firms regarding the transaction.  The 
Tax Court rejected Rovakat’s argument because one opinion was obtained from a law 
firm recommended to Rovakat by Valdez, the person that promoted and profited from the 
transaction, and the other opinion was not given to Rovakat’s partner on tax matters, Mr. 
Hovnanian, until years after the transactions were consummated.  Moreover, both 
opinions were found to be based upon unsupported assumptions.  Given these factual 
findings, we discern no error in the Tax Court’s conclusions that Rovakat lacked 
reasonable cause and did not act in good faith.  Accordingly, Rovakat cannot avoid the 
gross misstatement penalties. 
III. 
 Consistent with the foregoing and for substantially the same reasons articulated by 
the Tax Court in its comprehensive opinion, we will affirm the Tax Court’s December 21, 
2011 decision in this case. 
